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“Fishing” for Trouble?1: On the Appropriate Limits of 
a Civil Investigative Demand Issued by the CFPB 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
As its recent consent order involving Wells Fargo  
demonstrates,2 the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) 
looms over the activities of financial institutions. Starting in 2011,3 the 
agency has had a short and arguably “aggressive history.”4 In 2016, 
however, the CFPB traveled a “bridge too far”5 when the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia ruled that the CFPB did not 
have the authority to issue a Civil Investigative Demand (“CID”) to the 
Accrediting Council for Independent Colleges and Schools (“ACICS”) 
targeting its accrediting process.6 This ruling is notable because  the 
CFPB has encountered very few adverse court decisions in its brief, yet 
impactful existence.7 The case presents an interesting opportunity to 
examine two issues that are applicable not only to accrediting 
institutions, but financial institutions as well: the appropriate scope of 
the   agency’s   investigative   authority,8   and  who  is   the appropriate 
 
 
1. See FTC v. Nat’l Claims Serv., Inc., No. S. 98-283, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3312,  
at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 1999) (“However, an agency may not use its subpoena power to go 
on a fishing expedition.”); PHH Corp., CFPB No. 2012-MSC-PHH Corp-0001, at 5 (June 
12, 2012) (petition to modify or set aside civil investigative demand) [hereinafter PHH 
Petition] (citing FDIC v. Garner 126 F.3d 1138, 1146 (9th Cir. 1997). 
2. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., CFPB No. 2016-CFPB-0015 2 (Sept. 8, 2016). 
3. Lydia DePillis, A Watchdog Grows Up: The Inside Story of the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Jan. 11, 2014), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/01/11/a-watchdog-grows-up-the-inside- 
story-of-the-consumer-financial-protection-bureau/. 
4. DONALD C. LAMPE, JOE RODRIGUEZ, & AMANDA J. MOLLO, MORRISON FOERSTER, 
CLIENT ALERT: CFPB SUFFERS FIRST OFFICIAL CID CHALLENGE 3 (Apr. 27, 2016), https:// 
media2.mofo.com/documents/160427cfpbcidchallenge.pdf. 
5. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Accrediting Council for Indep. Colls. & Schs., 183 
F. Supp. 3d 79, 83 (D.D.C. Apr. 21, 2016). 
6. Id. at 84. 
7. See LAMPE, ET AL., supra note 4, at 2 (“[T]he ACICS case is significant because it 
represent[ed] the first time a court has ruled against the CFPB and limited the agency’s 
jurisdiction.”). 
8. See LAMPE, ET AL., supra note 4, at 1. 
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recipient of a CID.9 The circumstances of this case also offer a potential 
reprieve to recipients from the broad authority of the CFPB, as the 
decision requires the CFPB to more narrowly define the purpose of the 
investigation and places a higher burden on the CFPB to prove the 
reasonableness of its belief that the entity being investigated has 
information relevant to a violation when there is no “clear nexus 
between the consumer financial laws it is tasked with enforcing” and the 
practices they are investigating.10 
This Note examines the limits on the CFPB’s authority to issue 
CIDs and the potential effects on financial institutions. This Note 
proceeds in five parts. Part II provides background on the CFPB, the 
CID, and the recent court ruling.11 Part III examines the appropriate 
scope of the CID and when it may be considered overly burdensome.12 
Part IV discusses who is subject to a CID.13 Finally, Part V concludes  
the analysis and looks ahead to the future of the CFPB’s investigative 
authority.14 
 
II. BACKGROUND ON THE CFPB, THE CID, AND THE DISTRICT COURT 
RULING 
 
The investigative powers of the CFPB are derived from the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd- 
Frank”).15 According to the CFPB, Congress passed Dodd-Frank to 
“protect consumers from abusive financial services practices.”16 Under 
Dodd-Frank,  the  CFPB’s  remit  is  “to  prevent  a  covered  person  or 
 
9. See ORI LEV & STEPHEN LILLEY, MAYER BROWN, LEGAL UPDATE: SUBSTANTIAL 
ASSISTANCE: THE CFPB’S NEWEST TOOL 7 (July 2016), https://www.mayerbrown.com/files/ 
Publication/6e2a27aa-5015-4b6a-b7fb-a70461679db4/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ 
6411b9c2-685b-438a-a83f-516c2eb083eb/160718-UPDATE-CFS.pdf (discussing the  case 
in the context of the CFPB’s ability “to go after parties that might otherwise escape its 
reach”). 
10. See Accrediting Council for Indep. Colls. & Schs., 183 F. Supp. at 83 (explaining 
why the CFPB was not permitted to issue the CID in this particular case). 
11. See infra Part II. 
12. See infra Part III. 
13. See infra  Part IV. 
14. See infra Part V. 
15. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 
1011, 12 U.S.C. § 5491 (2015). 
16. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 5, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Accrediting 
Council For Indep. Colls. & Schs (D.C. Cir. Oct. 31, 2016) No. 16-5174 [hereinafter Brief  
of Petitioner] (quoting Pub. L. No. 111-23, 124 Stat. 1376. 1376 (2010)). 
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service provider from committing or engaging in an unfair, deceptive,  
or abusive act or practice under Federal law in connection with any 
transaction with a consumer for a consumer financial product or service, 
or the offering of a consumer financial product or service.”17  Among  
the consumer protection laws that the CFPB enforces are the Truth in 
Lending Act (“TILA”), the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 
(“FDCPA), and the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”).18 To fulfill its 
purpose, the CFPB has broad enforcement powers,19 perhaps the most 
useful of which is the CFPB’s investigative authority to send out 
CIDs.20 
 
A.         The Civil Investigative Demand 
 
According to the CFPB’s director, Richard Cordray (or 
“Director Cordray”), the CID is “crucial” to the CFPB’s operations.21 
Broadly, a CID is a “statutorily provided discovery tool[],” 
distinguishable from other discovery methods like interrogatories 
because a government entity may use them to procure information from 
a recipient before an official proceeding has even begun.22 Indeed, the 
fact that the CFPB can issue a CID well before any formal 
administrative procedure helps explain why these demands can be so 
challenging for recipients to deal with.23 With the advent of the CFPB, 
banking entities that had previously not been subjected to CIDs can now 
 
 
17.   Dodd-Frank § 1031(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5531(a). 
18. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 16, at 5 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 5481(12), (14)) (defining 
“Enumerated Consumer Laws” and “Federal Consumer Financial Law” for the purposes of 
the CFPB). 
19. See Dodd-Frank § 1021(c)(4), 12 U.S.C. § 5511(c)(4) (defining one of the primary 
functions of the agency as “supervising covered persons for compliance with Federal 
consumer financial law, and taking appropriate enforcement action to address violations of 
Federal consumer financial law”). 
20. Dodd-Frank § 1024(c)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 5562(c)(1) (stating that “the Bureau may, 
before the institution of any proceedings under the Federal consumer financial law, issue in 
writing, and cause to be served upon such person, a civil investigative demand . . .”). 
21. See PHH Corp., CFPB No. 2012-MSC-PHH Corp-0001, at 3 (Sept. 20, 2012) 
[hereinafter PHH Decision and Order] (decision and order on petition to modify or set aside 
civil investigative demand). 
22. See John Niemann, A Closer Look at the CFPB Civil Investigative Demand,  CFPB 
J. (July 23, 2016), http://cfpbjournal.com/issue/cfpb-journal/article/a-closer-look-at-the- 
cfpb-civil-investigative-demand (providing an overview of CFPB Civil Investigative 
Demands). 
23. Id. 
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receive one from this young agency.24 Pursuant to Dodd-Frank, the 
CFPB may issue CIDs to anyone who may have information or 
documents that pertain to a violation.25 The CID must notify the 
recipient of the behavior the agency considers to be abusive or contrary 
to federal consumer law.26 After a CID has been issued, the recipient is 
obligated to “meet and confer” with the agency investigator either 
within ten days after receiving it or before the deadline to file a petition 
disputing the CID (whichever is earlier).27 The meet and  confer  
process, on which the CFPB places a great deal of importance when 
considering modifications to the CID,28 is there so both parties can solve 
issues that may arise during the process.29 This requires the recipient at 
the time of the “meet and confer” with the CFPB to have all  
“knowledge necessary to resolve any issues relevant to compliance with 
the demand,”30 otherwise  those  issues  are  waived.31  During  the 
meeting, the CFPB is permitted to “negotiate and approve the terms of 
satisfactory compliance with civil investigative demands and, for good 
cause shown, may extend the time prescribed for compliance.”32 
 
24. Joseph T. Lynyak, III & Rebecca Tierney, Dealing with Civil Investigative 
Demands from the CFPB: Rules, Responses, and Practice Considerations, 130 BANKING 
L.J. § 9.01 771–72 (2013). Prior to the existence of the CFPB, banks were under the 
supervision of “federal banking agencies, which possess direct examination and supervision 
authority and therefore permit the banking agencies to examine practically all books and 
records of a company without the need to issue a CID.”  Id. at 771. 
25.   Dodd-Frank § 1024(c)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 5562(c)(1). 
26. Dodd-Frank § 1024(c)(2), 12 U.S.C. § 5562(c)(2) (“Each  civil  investigative  
demand shall state the nature of the conduct constituting the alleged violation which is under 
investigation and the provision of law applicable to such violation.”). 
27.    12 C.F.R. § 1080.6(c) (2016). 
28. See 12 C.F.R. § 1080.6(c)(3) (stating that the CFPB “will not consider petitions to 
set aside or modify a civil investigative demand unless the recipient has meaningfully 
engaged in the meet and confer process . . .”). 
29. See 12 C.F.R. § 1080.6(c)(1) (“The recipient must make available at the meeting 
personnel with the knowledge necessary to resolve any issues relevant to compliance with 
the demand.”). 
30. 12 C.F.R. § 1080.6(c)(1). Examples of measures potentially needed to satisfy this 
requirement include making available “individuals knowledgeable about the recipient’s 
information or records management systems and/or the recipient’s organizational structure.” 
Id. 
31. See 12 C.F.R. § 1080.6(c)(3) (“The Bureau will not consider petitions to set aside  
or modify a civil investigative demand unless the recipient has meaningfully engaged in the 
meet and confer process . . . and will only consider issues raised during the meet and confer 
process.”). 
32. 12 C.F.R. § 1080.6(d) (“The Assistant Director of the Office of Enforcement and 
the Deputy Assistant Directors of the Office of Enforcement are authorized to negotiate and 
approve the terms of satisfactory compliance with civil investigative demands and, for good 
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Following the meet and confer process, if the recipient is still 
unhappy with the parameters and demands of the CID, the recipient  
may petition the CFPB to modify or set aside the demand within twenty 
days of receipt.33 The recipient can ask for additional time to file the 
petition, but is unlikely to be granted an extension.34 In its petition, the 
recipient is obligated to “set forth all factual and legal objections to the 
[CID], including all appropriate arguments, affidavits, and other 
supporting documentation.”35 Further, the petition must certify that the 
recipient had meaningfully participated in the meet and confer process 
and had been unable to come to an understanding with the CFPB.36 
While both Dodd-Frank itself and the CFPB’s own rules allow for CID 
recipients to engage in this process,37 in practice, the chances of a CID 
being set aside by the CFPB are slim.38 Pursuant to the agency’s 
regulations, the CFPB director, a position endowed  with  broad 
discretion and removable only “for cause,”39 evaluates these petitions.40 
Unsurprisingly and perhaps understandably, it is unlikely that the 
director would “decide to quash a CID issued by his own staff 
attorneys.”41   As of February 18, 2017, Director Cordray has denied  all 
 
 
 
cause shown, may extend the time prescribed for compliance.”). 
33. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 
1052(f)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 5562(f)(1) (2015). 
34. 12 C.F.R. § 1080.6(e)(2) (indicating that the CFPB may rule on extensions of time, 
but also that “[r]equests for extensions of time are disfavored”) 
35.    12 C.F.R. § 1080.6(e). 
36.  12 C.F.R. § 1080.6(e)(1).  The petition must also indicate “the date, time, and place 
of each such meeting between counsel, and the names of all parties participating  in each 
such meeting.” Id. 
37.   Dodd-Frank § 1052(f), 12 U.S.C. § 5562(f); 12 C.F.R. § 1080.6. 
38. See J.H. Jennifer Lee, Kaleb McNeely, & Joseph T. Lynyak, The Long Arm of the 
CFPB, CORP. COUNSEL (July 2016), http://www.corpcounsel.com/id=1202763276703/The- 
Long-Arm-of-the-CFPB?slreturn=20160725205011(describing how these petitions are 
decided under a “low standard”). 
39. See BILL MAYBERRY, JASON EVANS, JOSHUA DAVEY & ANITA FOSS, 
MCGUIREWOODS, SUBJECT TO INQUIRY: D.C. CIRCUIT REBUKES CFPB IN PHH CASE 
(October 11, 2016), http://www.subjecttoinquiry.com/financial-institution-regulation/d-c- 
circuit-rebukes-cfpb-in-phh-case/. The Circuit Court for the District of Columbia recently 
ruled that this unique governance structure is unconstitutional over “concern[s] about the 
lack of protection against arbitrary decision-making and abuses of power by the sole 
director.” Id.; see also PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1, 6–8 (D.C.  
Cir. 2016). However, the only action that the court took was to strike the provision 
concerning removal from the statute. Id. 
40. See MAYBERRY ET AL., supra note 39 (citing 12 C.F.R. § 1080.6(3)(4)). 
41. Lee, et al., supra note 38. 
  
 
304 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE [Vol. 21 
the petitions that he has decided.42 
The difficulty of petitioning the CFPB to set aside a CID raises 
the question of whether recipients should just ignore the demand.43 In 
those situations, the CFPB may file an action in federal court asking for 
enforcement, thus taking judgment on the CID out of the CFPB’s 
hands.44 However, as Director Cordray has accurately observed, the 
judiciary traditionally gives agencies a wide berth with respect to their 
investigations.45  While the CFPB has relied on this deference in the   
past to its benefit, the D.C. District Court’s decision in 2016 “reveal[s] a 
changing tide.”46 
 
B. CFPB v. ACICS 
 
On August 25, 2015, the CFPB sent a CID to ACICS.47 Its  
stated purpose was to “determine whether any entity or person has 
engaged or is engaging in unlawful acts and practices in connection  
with accrediting for-profit colleges.”48 The demand asked the 
organization to testify “regarding ACICS’s policies, procedures, and 
practices relating to the accreditation of seven particular schools.”49 
Further, ACICS had: “(1) to identify all post-secondary educational 
institutions that ACICS had accredited since January 2010 and (2) to 
identify all individuals affiliated with ACICS who conducted any 
accreditation reviews since January 1, 2010 specific to twenty-one 
particular schools.”50 When ACICS received the  CID,  it  could  not 
come to an agreement with the CFPB regarding cooperation and thus 
asked the CFPB to set aside or modify the CID.51   Director Cordray 
 
42. See Petitions to Modify and Set Aside, CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION  
BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/policy-compliance/enforcement/petitions/ (last 
visited Feb. 10, 2017) (displaying all petitions received from CID recipients and CFPB 
responses). 
43. See Lee, et al., supra note 38 (“Facing poor odds of seting aside or modifying  
CIDs, recipients have also pursued the more passive strategy of simply not responding.”). 
44. Lee, et al., supra note 38. 
45. See PHH Decision and Order, supra note 21, at 4. 
46. Lee, et al., supra note 38. 
47. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Accrediting Council for Indep. Colls. & Schs., 183 
F. Supp. 3d 79, 80 (D.D.C. Apr. 21, 2016). 
48. Id. at 81. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
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turned down its request and instructed ACICS to engage in the meet and 
confer process with the agency’s attorneys.52 When ACICS continued  
to refuse to comply,53 the CFPB filed a complaint in federal court.54 
In deciding the case, the Federal District Court for the District  
of Columbia considered “(1) whether the agency has the authority to 
make the inquiry, (2) whether the information sought is reasonably 
relevant, and (3) whether the demand is not too indefinite.”55 If the CID 
met these requirements, it would have been enforceable unless its 
stipulations were too onerous for the recipient.56 While the district court 
acknowledged that courts historically have given agencies a great deal 
of latitude in this area,57 Judge Leon noted that “where it is clear that an 
agency either lacks the authority to investigate or is seeking information 
irrelevant to a lawful investigatory purpose, a court must set such 
inquiry aside.”58 
In deciding that the CFPB could not issue this particular CID,59 
Judge Leon focused on the language of the CID’s statement of purpose, 
particularly the clause “to determine whether any entity or person has 
engaged or is engaging in unlawful acts and practices in connection with 
accrediting for-profit colleges, in violation of . . . [f]ederal consumer 
financial protection law.”60 He acknowledged that the CFPB was aware 
that “none of these [consumer financial laws] address, regulate, or even 
tangentially implicate the accrediting process of for-profit colleges.”61 
The court observed that the CFPB “realiz[ed] the absence of a clear 
nexus between the consumer financial laws it is tasked with enforcing 
and its purported investigation into accreditation of for-profit  
schools.”62 Instead, the CFPB contended that since it could certainly 
investigate the activities of for-profit schools, it was also permitted to 
 
 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. (citing United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950); FTC v. 
Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1977); CFTC v. Ekasala, 62 F. Supp. 3d 88, 93 
(D.D.C. 2014)). 
56. Id. 
57.    Id. at 81–82. 
58. Id. at 82. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. (emphasis original). 
61. Id. at 83. 
62. Id. 
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examine an organization’s activities that could be tied to that potentially 
illicit conduct.63 It was “this post-hoc justification” that the court 
considered to be “a bridge too far!”64 The court rejected the CFPB’s 
argument that it had the right to investigate its relationship with the 
schools, even when ACICS had offered a description of its organization 
that did not support a potential connection with violations of consumer 
laws.65 The court concluded that “[a]lthough it is understandable that 
new agencies like the CFPB will struggle to establish the exact 
parameters of their authority, they must be especially prudent before 
choosing to plow head long into fields not clearly ceded to them by 
Congress.”66 
 
III. THE APPROPRIATE SCOPE OF A CID 
 
Perhaps the most crucial issue that the court touched on is the 
appropriate scope of a CID issued by the CFPB. Put another way, may 
the CFPB use its investigative authority to go on “fishing expeditions” 
on the basis of nothing more than mere optimism that its search will 
reveal violations of federal consumer laws?67 
 
A. The Stated Purpose of the CID 
 
As mentioned earlier, issues regarding the scope of CIDs can be 
traced to the fact that these demands are issued prior to the start of any 
official proceeding.68 In the CFPB’s first decision regarding a petition  
to modify or set aside a CID,69 Director Cordray asserted that although 
 
 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. at 84. 
67. See PHH Petition, supra note 1, at 5 (citing FDIC v. Garner 126 F.3d 1138, 1146 
(9th Cir. 1997); FTC v. Nat’l Claims Serv., Inc., No. S. 98-283, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3312, at 
*2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 1999)). 
68. John Niemann, A Closer Look at the CFPB Civil Investigative Demand, CFPB J. 
(July 23, 2016), http://cfpbjournal.com/issue/cfpb-journal/article/a-closer-look-at-the-cfpb- 
civil-investigative-demand (providing an overview of CFPB Civil Investigative Demands). 
69. See PHH Decision and Order, supra note 21 (decision and order on petition to 
modify or set aside civil investigative demand). Being the first decision, Director Cordray 
took note of its “precedential value” and spent no small amount of time trying “to provide 
more specific guidance for parties assessing their course of conduct in similar  
circumstances . . . .”  PHH Decision and Order, supra note 21, at 1. 
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the agency may gather enough information from publicly available 
sources to issue a CID,70 there is usually “a substantial information gap” 
between the agency and the target at that initial phase.71 With this in 
mind, the director stated that the purpose of the CID is to close this gap 
between the CFPB and the recipient so the agency can decide whether  
or not to investigate the recipient in more detail.72 Director Cordray 
suggested that this can also work in favor of the recipient, as it may lead 
to more expeditious resolution of the matter if it turns out that there was 
no violation.73 However, the director emphasized that at  the  early 
stages, the agency is required to broaden the scope of its CIDs in order 
to adequately familiarize itself with the situation.74 Director Cordray 
adopted a deferential standard of review for petitions to set aside  
CIDs,75 and asserted that the CFPB “can investigate merely on  
suspicion that the law is being violated, or even just because it wants 
assurance that it is not.”76 Under this interpretation, no CID issued by  
the CFPB could be considered overly broad as a wide net will either 
catch  some  form  of  unlawful  activity  or  enable  the  agency  to  be 
 
70. PHH Decision and Order, supra note 21, at 3. Specifically, Cordray determined  
that these public sources like news stories and consumer complaints would give the agency 
“reason to believe that ‘a[] person may be in possession, custody or control’ of documents, 
items or information ‘relevant to a violation’ of federal consumer financial  law.”  Id. 
(quoting Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 
1052(c)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 5562(c)(1) (2015)). 
71. PHH Decision and Order, supra note 21, at 3. 
72. PHH Decision and Order, supra note 21, at 3. 
73. PHH Decision and Order, supra note 21, at 3. The director also noted that “if the 
result of the CID process is to substantiate a likely violation of law, then unless the subject 
desires to adopt a “scorched earth” policy of delay and obfuscation, once again the closing  
of the information gap between the parties is likely to lead to a more sensible resolution of 
the matter with less accompanying time and expense.” PHH Decision and Order, supra note 
21, at 3. 
74. PHH Decision and Order, supra note 21, at 3. 
75. The standard used by the CFPB in these matters is slightly different from what the 
D.C. Circuit used in ACICS. PHH Decision and Order, supra note 21, at 4. The standard  
that the agency uses will reject a petition to set aside a CID if “(1) the investigation is for a 
lawfully authorized purpose; (2) the information requested is relevant to the investigation; 
and (3) procedural requirements are followed.”  PHH Decision and Order, supra note 21,  at 
4. If the director is satisfied that those three criteria have been met, he will reject the 
petition “unless the subject demonstrates the CID imposes an ‘undue burden’ or constitutes 
an abuse of the court’s process.” PHH Decision and Order, supra note 21, at 4.  Notably,  
the third factor used by the CFPB differs from the factor used by Judge Leon, which  
requires that “the demand [be] not too indefinite.” See Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. 
Accrediting Council for Indep. Colls. & Schs., 183 F. Supp. 3d 79, 81 (D.D.C. Apr. 21, 
2016). 
76. See PHH Decision and Order, supra note 21, at 4. 
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satisfied that the recipient is conducting itself appropriately.77 In this 
way, the petition process that Congress specifically provided for in 
Dodd-Frank is rendered essentially meaningless.78 
Director Cordray made this argument—that the CFPB could 
initiate an investigation simply for “assurance”—in response to a 
petition made by PHH Corporation, a financial services company that 
provides mortgage services to other firms.79 Much of PHH’s argument 
in its petition focused on the broad scope of the issued CID.80 It first 
contended that the CID did not give PHH adequate notice.81 It argued 
that unless the conduct leading to the alleged violation is clearly 
identified, the recipient will not be able to meet the obligations of the 
demand or compose a coherent challenge to the aspects of the demand 
that serve no readily ascertainable purpose.82 As the scope of the 
investigation targeted the mortgage lending process generally, PHH 
contended that the CID’s stated purpose did not “state the nature of the 
conduct” that was under investigation and therefore did not comply with 
the stipulations of the statute.83 Second, PHH argued that the CFPB 
could not use its investigative authority “to go on fishing expeditions.”84 
The CID asked for all relevant documents pertaining to PHH’s captive 
reinsurance business, which PHH believed was “equivalent to an open 
 
 
77. See PHH Decision and Order, supra note 21, at 4–5. 
78. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1052(f), 12 
U.S.C. § 5562(f) (2015) (outlining the CID petition process). 
79. PHH Petition, supra note 1.  On June 12, 2012, PHH Corporation, filed a petition  
to modify or set aside a CID issued by the CFPB. PHH Petition, supra note 1. Earlier that 
year, the CFPB disclosed to PHH that it was investigating whether the corporation’s 
practices had violated the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act. PHH Decision and Order, 
supra note 21, at 4–5. In May of that year, the CFPB requested answers via a CID to twenty-
one interrogatories and thirty-three document requests. PHH Decision and Order, supra note 
21, at 2. PHH would also play an important role in the CFPB’s evolution several years later. 
MAYBERRY ET AL., supra note 39; PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1, 6–
8 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
80. PHH Petition, supra note 1, at 1–2, 5–8 (June 12, 2012). The CID claimed that its 
purpose was “to determine whether mortgage lenders and private mortgage insurance 
providers or other unnamed persons have engaged in, or are engaging in, unlawful acts or 
practices in connection with residential mortgage loans . . . .” PHH Petition, supra note 1, at 
2. 
81. PHH Petition, supra note 1, at 1. 
82. PHH Petition, supra note 1, at 2. 
83. PHH Petition, supra note 1, at 2. 
84. PHH Petition, supra note 1, at 5 (citing FDIC v. Garner, 126 F.3d 1138, 1146 (9th 
Cir. 1997); FTC v. Nat’l Claims Serv., Inc., No. S 98-283, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3312, at *2 
(E.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 1999)). 
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records search of all business conducted by PHH over the last eleven 
years.”85 It further asserted that the CFPB’s request must  be 
appropriately tailored to target specific conduct.86 Instead, the CFPB 
asked for more than a decade’s worth of records based on a hunch that a 
violation would turn up, according to PHH.87 
ACICS similarly disputed the scope of the CID.88 It argued that 
the requirement of 12 U.S.C. § 5562(c), that the CID identify the 
violating conduct, “is vital to the respondent’s ability to understand and 
respond to the CID, as well as to formulate objections to the same.”89 
ACICS claimed that the statement of purpose was far too amorphous to 
comply with, and in fact applied not only to ACICS, but “every 
accrediting agency, for-profit school and student(s) therein.”90 ACICS 
echoed this argument in court, stating that under the Consumer 
Financial Protection Act of 2010 (“CFPA”), “[t]he Bureau can only 
propound a CID that seeks information that is relevant to conduct that 
could be actionable under a law that the Bureau enforces.”91  Thus, 
ACICS contended that the CFPB was ignoring limits that Congress had 
expressly placed on the agency.92 
The CFPB denied both PHH’s and ACICS’s arguments on 
similar grounds.93  Director Cordray rejected PHH’s argument that the 
 
 
85. PHH Petition, supra note 1, at 7–8. 
86. PHH Petition, supra note 1, at 8 (citing U.S. v. Constr. Prods. Research, Inc., 73 
F.3d 464, 471 (2nd Cir. 1996); FTC v. Invention Submission Corp., 965 F.2d 1086, 1089 
(D.C. Cir. 1992); FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1977)). 
87. PHH Petition, supra note 1, at 8 (citing U.S. v. Constr. Prods. Research, Inc., 73 
F.3d 464, 471 (2nd Cir. 1996); FTC v. Invention Submission Corp., 965 F.2d 1086, 1089 
(D.C. Cir. 1992); FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1977)). 
88. PHH Petition, supra note 1, at 10–11; Accrediting Council for Indep. Colls. and 
Schs.’s Opposition to the CFPB’s Petition to Enforce Civil Investigative Demand,  
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Accrediting Council for Indep. Colls. & Schs, 183 F. Supp. 
3d 79 (D.D.C. Apr. 21, 2016) (No. 1:15-CV-01838-RJL) 9 [hereinafter Opposition to the 
CFPB’s Petition to Enforce Civil Investigative Demand]. 
89. Accrediting Council for Indep. Colls. & Schs., CFPB No. 2015-MISC-ACICS- 
0001, at 10 (Sept. 14, 2015) (petition to modify or set aside civil investigative demand). 
90.    Id. at 10–11. 
91. Opposition to the CFPB’s Petition to Enforce Civil Investigative Demand, supra 
note 88, at 10. 
92. Opposition to the CFPB’s Petition to Enforce Civil Investigative Demand, supra 
note 88, at 10. 
93. PHH Decision and Order, supra note 21, at 1; Accrediting Council for Indep. Colls. 
& Schs., CFPB No. 2015-MISC-ACICS-0001, at 1 (Oct. 8, 2015) (decision and order on 
petition to modify or set aside civil investigative demand) [hereinafter ACICS Decision and 
Order]. 
  
 
 
310 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE          [Vol. 21 
CID did not clearly identify the investigation’s purpose,94 arguing that 
the CID’s intent can be demarcated “quite generally.”95 Director 
Cordray also argued that the inquiry was appropriately and reasonably 
directed to aspects of the corporation “involved in the narrower function 
of selecting where to direct the company’s mortgage insurance 
business.”96 According to Director Cordray, “[t]he Bureau has ample 
reason to believe that its inquiries are relevant to the ongoing 
investigation, and the courts presume the relevance and appropriateness 
of the CID unless the requests are ‘obviously wrong.’”97  With respect   
to ACICS’s petition, the CFPB relied on its own precedent established 
over the past few years to conclude that the disputed statement of 
purpose was “functionally equivalent” to those the agency had already 
determined “satisfied the requirements of the statute and regulations.”98 
Further, the agency emphasized that “a detailed narrative” was not 
necessary to satisfy the demands of the statute.99 Similar to his  
reasoning in the PHH decision, Director Cordray stated that “the  
purpose of an investigation is ‘to discover and procure evidence, not to 
prove a pending charge or complaint, but upon which to make one if, in 
the [Bureau’s] judgment, the facts thus discovered should justify doing 
so.’”100 Thus, according to the CFPB, ACICS had no defense to a CID 
because the CID will either justify its issuance by finding unlawful 
behavior, or will only prove its irrelevance after it has already been 
complied with.101 
In response to the CFPB’s similar arguments in district court, 
Judge Leon had a one word response: “Please.”102 Focusing on  the 
CID’s statement of purpose, the court concluded that the CID “said 
nothing about an investigation into the lending or financial advisory 
practices  of  for-profit  schools.”103    Instead,  the  court  noted  that the 
 
94. PHH Decision and Order, supra note 21, at 5. 
95. PHH Decision and Order, supra note 21, at 6 (quoting FTC v. O’Connell 
Associates, Inc. 828 F. Supp. 165, 171 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)). 
96. PHH Decision and Order, supra note 21, at 5. 
97. PHH Decision and Order, supra note 21, at 7. 
98. PHH Decision and Order, supra note 21, at 3. 
99. PHH Decision and Order, supra note 21, at 3. 
100. PHH Decision and Order, supra note 21, at 3. 
101. See PHH Decision and Order, supra note 21, at 2–3. 
102. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Accrediting Council for Indep. Colls. & Schs., 183 
F.Supp. 3d 79, 83 (D.D.C. Apr. 21, 2016). 
103. Id. 
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language of the statement of purpose (as well as the CID’s specific 
requests) demonstrated the CFPB’s intent to “target[] the accreditation 
process generally.”104 Additionally, Judge Leon dismissed as a “post- 
hoc justification” the CFPB’s argument that it was permitted to 
investigate ACICS’s assertions of fact and evaluate whether or not they 
were to its liking.105 Although the court did not explicitly reject the 
CFPB’s general belief that it is entitled to investigate entities simply 
because it wants assurance that federal consumer laws are being 
complied with, the implication of the court’s holding is that some limit 
exists to the CFPB’s ability to bootstrap its way into an investigation.106 
However, the court’s explicit holding in ACICS is fairly narrow.107 
Judge Leon did not make any sweeping declarations of law regarding 
the limits of the CFPB’s investigative authority, but limited the 
holding to the very fact specific nature of this case, simply 
concluding that the CFPB could not investigate the accreditation 
process.108 Indeed, this has led some commentators to believe that 
“Judge Leon may have provided the Bureau with an alternative 
remedy.”109 The court seemed to hint at the possibility that the CFPB 
could investigate ACICS’s connection with for-profit schools and those 
institutions’ potentially illicit conduct if the agency had only composed 
the CID appropriately.110 The court may simply have encouraged the 
CFPB to “consider revising the CID, and its stated purpose, to a more 
narrowly tailored inquiry into those potential connections.”111 
However, rather than an oversight, this may have been the point. As 
PHH had previously advocated, the 12 U.S.C. § 5562(c) requirement 
can be reasonably interpreted as being intended to both increase the 
likelihood that a recipient will fully comply with the agency’s directives 
and to also permit a recipient to mount a coherent challenge to the 
CID’s request.112   By requiring the CFPB to narrow and specify the 
 
 
104. Id. at 84. 
105. Id. at 83. 
106. Id. 
107. See id. at 84. 
108. Id. 
109. LAMPE, ET AL., supra note 4, at 3. 
110. LAMPE, ET AL., supra note 4, at 3; Accrediting Council for Indep. Colls. & Schs., 
183 F. Supp. 3d 79, 83 – 84  (D.D.C. 2016). 
111. LAMPE, ET AL., supra note 4, at 3. 
112. See PHH Petition, supra note 1, at 2. 
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purpose of the CID,113 the court gave recipients a much better chance to 
prepare themselves for a more meaningful meet and confer process 
where both parties can actually “resolve all issues regarding 
compliance.”114 Indeed, the court’s “limitation” on the CFPB’s 
investigatory authority may actually be to the agency’s benefit because  
a specific inquiry can aid the recipient in responding to the CID more 
effectively than a request for a broad survey of the recipient’s activities 
can.115 It may also help the CFPB avoid situations where the recipient, 
while trying to decipher what conduct the CFPB is actually targeting, 
engages in a “policy of delay and obfuscation.”116 
 
B. Undue Burden 
 
Another relevant facet in analyzing the appropriate scope of a 
CID is the degree of the burden imposed on the recipient.117 Both the 
CFPB and the district court used a framework that would refuse to 
enforce a CID if it would constitute an undue burden even if all other 
criteria had been met.118 Proving that a CID is an undue burden has 
historically been a challenge, however.119 Generally, an administrative 
subpoena like a CID will only “be deemed unduly burdensome if 
compliance threatens to unduly disrupt or seriously hinder normal 
operations of a business.”120 
Some practitioners have commented that the CID timeline and 
process  pose  various  difficulties  for  a  recipient.121    It  is  not  clear, 
 
113. See LAMPE, ET AL., supra note 4, at 3. 
114.    See 12 C.F.R. § 1080.6(c) (2016). 
115. See PHH Petition, supra note 1 at 2 (June 12, 2012) (The “explicit statutory 
requirement is crucial to the recipient’s ability to understand and respond to the CID, as well 
as to formulate appropriate objections and to challenge the overbroad aspects of the CID.”). 
116. PHH Decision and Order, supra note 21, at 3. 
117. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Accrediting Council for Indep. Colls. & Schs., 183 
F. Supp. 3d 79, 81 (D.D.C. 2016). 
118. PHH Decision and Order, supra note 21, at 5; Accrediting Council for Indep. Colls. 
& Schs., 183 F. Supp. 3d at 81. 
119. See PHH Decision and Order, supra note 21, at 6 (citing Endicott Johnson Corp. v. 
Perkins, 317 U.S. 501, 509 (1943)) (noting that “the courts place a significant legal burden 
on the party challenging a CID or administrative subpoena on these grounds”). 
120. FTC v. Invention Submission Corp., 965 F.2d 1086, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
121. See, e.g., Dylan W. Howard, The CFPB’s Uncivil Civil Investigative Demands, 
LAW 360 (Nov. 2014), https://www.law360.com/articles/599019/the-cfpb-s-uncivil-civil- 
investigative-demands (discussing the challenges of meeting the requirements for a CID 
issued by the CFPB). 
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however, that the timeline demands of the CFPB’s CID differ all that 
much from other federal agencies.122 When the agency designed its 
rules, it drew from existing agency regulations, especially the Federal 
Trade Commission (“FTC”).123 For example, while the FTC does 
provide four more days for the recipient to fulfill the meet and confer 
process,124 recipients of a CID from the FTC receive the same amount  
of time to petition a demand.125 Also, the FTC similarly states that it  
will refuse to “consider petitions to quash or limit absent a pre-filing 
meet and confer session with Commission staff and, absent 
extraordinary circumstances, will consider only issues raised during the 
meet and confer process.”126 Some practitioners have argued that while 
these two agencies have similar rules as written, the “family 
resemblance stops on paper in many areas.”127 While the FTC and the 
CFPB have similar “meet and confer” rules, the FTC “rarely held to a 
hard and fast meeting within this meet and confer deadline.”128 
Meanwhile, the CFPB “will come expecting a substantive, detailed 
discussion about concerns regarding process and scope as well as 
detailed information on the nature and location of the materials sought,” 
which is another departure from the FTC.129 With such strict adherence 
to the letter of the rules, it is perhaps no surprise that PHH and ACICS 
could not successfully challenge the CFPB on these grounds.130 
Aside from the onerous processes a recipient can encounter in 
responding to a CID, there is also the potential burden that comes from 
seeking   to   challenge   a   CID.131      While   the   CFPB   considers its 
 
122. See e.g., 12 C.F.R § 1080.1 (2016) (governing the FTC investigative processes); 16 
C.F.R. pt. 3; 17 C.F.R. pt. 201 et seq. (2016) (governing the SEC investigative processes). 
123. Jonice Gray Tucker & Amanda Raines, CFPB Investigations in Focus: Navigating 
CIDs, LAW 360 (July 11, 2013, 12:16 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/455982/cfpb- 
investigations-in-focus-navigating-cids. 
124. 16 C.F.R. § 2.7(k) (2016) (“[A] recipient of Commission compulsory process shall 
meet and confer with Commission staff within 14 days after receipt of process or before the 
deadline for filing a petition to quash . . . .”). 
125. Federal Trade Commission Act § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 57b-1(f)(1) (2015) (stating that 
the recipient of civil investigative demand from the Commission must file a petition “no[] 
later than 20 days after the service of any civil investigative demand . . .”). 
126.   16 C.F.R. § 2.7(k) (2016). 
127. See Tucker & Raines, supra note 123. 
128. Tucker & Raines, supra note 123. 
129. Tucker & Raines, supra note 123. 
130. See PHH Decision and Order, supra note 21, at 6; Brief of Petitioner, supra note 
16, at 29. 
131. See TED KORNOBIS & STEPHANIE C. ROBINSON, K&L GATES: LEGAL INSIGHT: D.C. 
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investigations to be “non-public, the CFPB has taken the position that 
petitions to set aside a CID are public proceedings and, absent 
extraordinary circumstances, it will post a company’s petition on its 
website shortly after the petition is filed.”132  In a recent decision,133 the 
D.C. District Court noted how the announcement of an investigation 
might inflict both reputational and financial harm to the recipient, even 
before the CFPB might find anything wrong.134  In a decision arising   
out of the same matter,135 a former corporate officer of a recipient 
contended that as the entity required “access to hundreds of millions of 
dollars in capital from banks and private investors,”136 public disclosure 
of the CFPB investigation could lead these lenders to “withdraw their 
capital access and invest elsewhere.”137 The D.C. District Court  did 
leave open the option for recipients of CIDs to ask for confidentiality 
while they ask the CFPB to set aside the investigative instrument, but 
these cases help demonstrate how a broad CID can potentially have 
substantial ramifications.138 
Finally, as the United States Chamber of Commerce argued in 
its amicus brief in support of ACICS, the CFPB’s arguable infringement 
into another agency’s domain (in this case, the Department of 
Education’s  domain)  can  lead  to  regulatory  uncertainty.139    If  it  is 
 
DISTRICT COURT DECISION SUPPORTS PRINCIPLE ALLOWING COMPANIES  TO  CHALLENGE 
CFPB INFORMATION REQUESTS  WITHOUT FEAR OF PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF INVESTIGATION 1 
(2015), http://www.klgates.com/dc-district-court-decision-supports-principle-of-allowing- 
companies-to-challenge-cfpb-information-requests-without-fear-of-public-disclosure-of- 
investigation-11-05-20152/. 
132. Id. at 3. 
133. Plaintiff v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141812 (D.D.C. 
Oct. 16, 2015). The plaintiffs in the case were entities who provided consumer credit 
counseling. Id. at *1. They had sought an injunctive order that would prevent the CFPB  
from proceeding with a deposition-type hearing after the agency had denied the plaintiff’s 
counsel to be present at the hearing. Id. at *2–3. The court concluded by “decid[ing] to 
unseal the case, but redact the names of the parties involved.” KORNOBIS & ROBINSON,  
supra note 131, at 4. 
134. KORNOBIS & ROBINSON, supra note 131, at 4. In contrast, the CFPB  had  
“dismissed identical claims as ‘remote’ and stated that ‘the mere fact that [an entity] would 
suffer embarrassment as a result of [its] associations with law enforcement investigations is 
not the type of ‘harm’ that justifies confidentiality.” KORNOBIS & ROBINSON, supa note 131, 
at 4. 
135. John Doe Co. No. 1 v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78988 
(D.D.C. June 15, 2016). 
136. Id. at *27 (internal quotations omitted). 
137. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
138. See KORNOBIS & ROBINSON, supra note 131, at 5. 
139. Brief for Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae 
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unclear who the regulator is or how many regulators there may be for a 
certain activity, an entity may seek to evade regulation altogether by 
“tightening product availability, eliminating features, or exiting 
particular product categories.”140 Although the possibility  that  the 
CFPB is going beyond its statutory boundaries is troubling in and of 
itself and will be discussed further, issuing CIDs in these circumstances 
also can compel entities to alter their compliance policies,141 and may 
even lead “to higher prices for consumers and reduced choice in 
consumer financial products.”142 Banks may be among the most 
vulnerable to this burden as it was far less common for them to receive 
CIDs prior to Dodd-Frank.143 
Both PHH and ACICS argued that the CID imposed an undue 
burden on their businesses.144 PHH alleged that the  CID  required 
review of any document that “touches on the issue of private mortgage 
insurance” and would compel the company to incur substantial expenses 
in responding to the agency’s request.145 Further, PHH noted that it had 
offered to turn over a significant number of documents that  were  
already available and to cooperate with the CFPB if the agency deemed 
that additional documents were relevant.146 Because the CFPB did not 
grant PHH’s request “to both produce materials and preserve its 
objections,”147 PHH argued that it had been forced into “the untenable 
position of either filing its petition by June 12, 2012, or waiving its 
objections.”148 It concluded that the investigative demand should be 
more narrowly tailored to reduce its negative impact on the recipient’s 
operations.149 
ACICS   similarly   argued   that   the   CID   was  unreasonably 
 
Supporting Respondent at 16–18, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Accrediting Council for 
Indep. Colls. and Schs., 183 F. Supp. 3d. (2016) (No. 6-5174). 
140.    Id. at 17 (citing AT&T Inc. v. FCC, 452 F.3d 830, 836 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). 
141. Id. at 18. 
142. Id. at 17. 
143. See Lynyak & Tierney, supra note 24, at 771–72. 
144. PHH Corp., CFPB No. 2012-MSC-PHH Corp-0001, at 8 (June 12, 2012) (petition 
to modify or set aside civil investigative demand); Opposition to the CFPB’s Petition to 
Enforce Civil Investigative Demand, supra note 88, at 7. 
145. PHH Petition, supra note 1, at 8. 
146. PHH Petition, supra note 1, at 9. 
147. PHH Petition, supra note 1, at 9. 
148. PHH Petition, supra note 1, at 9. 
149. PHH Petition, supra note 1, at 10 (citing U.S. Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n v. The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 2d 27, 35–36 (D.C. 2005)). 
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burdensome, stating that “the CID imposes a burden on ACICS that 
extends well beyond the financial impact and time commitment of 
responding to the broad information request.”150 It illustrated how the 
CID requested the names of “volunteer evaluators who serve in an 
academic capacity at a peer institution or other institution of higher 
education, including instructors, professors and adjunct professors who 
have ‘day jobs,’ but volunteer their time for the accrediting process.”151 
ACICS argued that enforcement of the CID would have a chilling effect 
on those who would otherwise choose to volunteer their time.152 The 
council even went as far as to assert that “some evaluators have 
expressed their intention to no longer participate in the accrediting 
review process.”153 
The CFPB rejected  both  of  these  arguments.154  Director 
Cordray argued that PHH “offered little to no detail to make the kind of 
showing required to substantiate these claims.”155 As a general rule, the 
CFPB requires that “in order to meet its legal burden, the subject must 
undertake a good-faith effort to show ‘the exact nature and extent of the 
hardship’ imposed and state specifically how compliance will harm its 
business.”156 Director Cordray concluded that PHH had not met  its 
burden here, claiming that it had offered only generalized grievances in 
support of its claim.157 With respect to ACICS’s argument, the CFPB in 
its brief dismissed it as “speculation.”158 The CFPB contended that the 
ACICS’s argument concerning the potential chilling effect of the CID 
on the evaluator pool did not “suggest[] that compliance with the CID 
would ‘unduly disrupt’ or ‘seriously hinder’ ACICS’s normal business 
 
 
 
150. Opposition to the CFPB’s Petition to Enforce Civil Investigative Demand, supra 
note 88, at 16. 
151. Opposition to the CFPB’s Petition to Enforce Civil Investigative Demand, supra 
note 88, at 16–17. 
152. Opposition to the CFPB’s Petition to Enforce Civil Investigative Demand, supra 
note 88, at 17. 
153. Opposition to the CFPB’s Petition to Enforce Civil Investigative Demand, supra 
note 88, at 17. 
154. See PHH Decision and Order, supra note 21, at 6; Brief of Petitioner, supra note 
16, at 29. 
155. PHH Decision and Order, supra note 21, at 6. 
156. PHH Decision and Order, supra note 21, at 6. (quoting FTC v. Markin, 391 F. 
Supp. 865, 870–71 (W.D. Mich. 1974), aff’d, 532 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1976)). 
157. PHH Decision and Order supra note 21, at 6. 
158. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 16, at 29. 
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operations.”159 
The court in ACICS had the opportunity to comment on whether 
or not the CID in question was overly burdensome, but declined to do 
so.160  While Judge Leon mentioned that the CFPB was requesting “a   
list of all individuals involved in the accreditation of twenty-one 
enumerated schools,”161 he did so to emphasize that this was something 
that the CFPB was not “empowered to do” and not to comment on the 
potential strain put on ACICS.162 Judge Leon may have sidestepped the 
“undue burden” issue because of potential doubts about ACICS’s 
argument that the CID’s chilling effect on the future participation was 
actually an undue burden,163 or simply because he wanted to focus on  
the CFPB’s authority in this case rather than analyze whether this 
particular CID was “unduly burdensome.”164 However, limiting the 
overall scope of a CID may lift the burden on institutions when they 
comply with the demand.165 A broader CID will almost certainly be 
more demanding on a recipient.166 For instance, PHH asserted that the 
CFPB’s “fishing expedition” would “require the production of 
voluminous amounts of irrelevant material, and will require PHH to 
conduct an unreasonable search of all PHH facilities.”167 Under the 
court’s holding, recipients of a CID should have more  success 
contesting the latitude of a CID’s purpose rather than speculating on the 
potential disruptions to its business.168 
 
 
 
 
159. Id. 
160. See generally, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Accrediting Council for Indep. Colls. 
& Schs, 183 F. Supp. 3d 79 (D.D.C. 2016). 
161.    Id. at 83–84. 
162. Id. 
163. See Opposition to the CFPB’s Petition to Enforce Civil Investigative Demand, 
supra note 88, at 17. 
164. Since the legal standard used by the court only considers the burden of the CID if 
the three initial requirements are met, the court may have considered it unnecessary to 
address the burden on ACICS since it had already found that the CFPB did not “have the 
statutory authority to issue the CID in question . . . .” Accrediting Council for Indep. Colls. 
& Schs., 183 F. Supp. 3d at 82. 
165. See PHH Petition, supra note 1, at 8. 
166. See PHH Petition, supra note 1, at 8. 
167. PHH Petition, supra note 1, at 8. 
168. See Accrediting Council for Indep. Colls. & Schs., 183 F. Supp. 3d at 84 (ruling 
that the CFPB overstepped its authority by issuing the CID, but choosing not to conduct an 
analysis of the burden that the CID would impose on ACICS). 
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IV. WHO IS THE APPROPRIATE RECIPIENT OF A CID? 
 
The ACICS decision also offered an opportunity to look at who 
the appropriate subject of a CID is.169 As discussed earlier,  the  
language under Dodd-Frank is broad, permitting the CFPB to issue the 
investigative instrument when the agency believes that an entity 
possesses information that relates to a violation of consumer laws.170 
Indeed, this language suggests that the investigative authority of the 
CFPB is far broader than its enforcement authority under the CFPA, 
which concerns “covered persons”171 as well as those who “provide 
substantial assistance” to a covered person.172 
“Substantial assistance” is an “enforcement tool” that the CFPB 
has been using with increasing regularity.173 The provision has broad 
implications as “it applies to ‘any person;’ it applies ‘notwithstanding 
any provision of this title;’ and it allows imposition of liability 
equivalent to that imposed on the recipient of the assistance.”174  While  
it is tempting to conclude that the CFPB will use “substantial  
assistance” only in scenarios where it seeks to go after companies that 
“do not themselves qualify as covered persons or service providers” 
(like ACICS), financial institutions should be aware of their potential 
liability under this provision.175 First, the agency can use “substantial 
assistance . . . as one of multiple bases asserting jurisdiction in an 
enforcement action.”176 For instance, in a consent order issued to 
Citibank N.A. the CFPB claimed that Citibank had committed a 
violation not only because it had “engaged in unfair acts and practices,” 
 
169. See id. at 82–83. 
170. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 
1052(c)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 5562(c)(1) (2015). 
171. Dodd-Frank § 1002(6), 12 U.S.C. § 5481(6) (defining a covered person as “any 
person that engages in offering or providing a consumer financial product or service”). 
172. Dodd-Frank § 1036,12 U.S.C. § 5536 (stating that it is unlawful for “any person to 
knowingly or recklessly provide substantial assistance to a covered person or service 
provider in violation of the provisions of section 1031, or any rule or order issued 
thereunder, and notwithstanding any provision of this title, the provider of such substantial 
assistance shall be deemed to be in violation of that section to the same extent as the person 
to whom such assistance is provided”). 
173. See LEV & LILLEY, supra note 9, at 6. 
174. LEV & LILLEY, supra note 9, at 2. For reasons that will become significant later,  
the “any person” coverage has been deemed to apply “generically.” See Lee, et al., supra 
note 38. 
175. See LEV & LILLEY, supra note 9, at 6. 
176. See LEV & LILLEY, supra note 9, at 6. 
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but because it had “provided substantial assistance to covered persons 
engaged in deceptive acts or practices by overstating the annual 
percentage rate (APR) for accounts in Sales Files . . . [that] it provided 
to debt buyers.”177 Therefore, in certain situations, the CFPB can use 
“substantial assistance” as an additional jurisdictional hook even when 
an entity is already covered.178 
More significantly, however, the CFPB has attempted to use the 
“substantial assistance” provision to target entities that are not normally 
under its purview.179 The ACICS case is a prime example as the 
accreditation of for-profit schools is “not a financial product or 
service.”180 Instead, “[t]o get over this  hurdle,  the  CFPB  sought  to 
assert that by accrediting for-profit schools, the accrediting body was 
providing substantial assistance to potential UDAAPs181 committed by 
those schools in connection with private student loans.”182 In court, the 
CFPB contended that it was well within its authority to issue the CID 
because it “is empowered to take action” under the substantial  
assistance provision.183 As Director Cordray commented, “‘[i]f an 
accrediting agency is facilitating for-profit colleges’ misleading 
consumers, treating them unfairly and deceptively, then that’s  
something we should look at.’”184 
In response to the CFPB’s allegations, ACICS argued that it 
“does not offer any assistance in the area of student finance to its 
accredited institutions, let alone substantial assistance.”185 It denied any 
participation in “any . . . financial arrangement between its accredited 
institutions and students.”186   ACICS also rejected the notion that the 
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180. See LEV & LILLEY, supra note 9, at 6. 
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CFPB had made a showing that “ACICS ‘in some sort associated [itself] 
with the venture, . . . that [it] sought by [its] action to make it 
succeed.’”187 Furthermore, ACICS claimed that its  status  as  a  non- 
profit eliminated any potential “economic motivation to assist for-profit 
schools in alleged deceptive practices that in turn lead to students taking 
out private loans to attend for-profit colleges.”188 In addition, because 
ACICS did not make or fund student loans, it argued that “it cannot be 
said that the alleged practice of deceiving students into taking out 
private loans is the ‘direct or foreseeable result of ACICS’s  
accreditation process.’”189 In conclusion, ACICS argued that the CFPB 
alleged conduct “that could never be actionable under any consumer 
financial law, including the Bureau’s UDAAP authority.”190 
While the term “substantial assistance” is notably absent from 
Judge Leon’s ruling, the opinion does address the issue.191 The court 
acknowledged that the investigation of “the lending practices of for- 
profit schools” was a legitimate aim for the CFPB.192 Thus, if ACICS 
was “knowingly or recklessly provid[ing] substantial assistance to” 
these for-profit schools and their potentially illegal lending practices, it 
would in theory fall under the CFPB’s jurisdiction.193 However, the 
CFPB’s argument failed for two reasons.194 First, as discussed above, 
the scope of the CID was far too broad.195 The demand in question 
concerned the general process of “accrediting for-profit colleges”196 and 
did not contain an allegation that ACICS was aiding these schools in the 
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violation of consumer protection laws.197 Even more broadly, the CID 
“sa[id] nothing about an investigation into the lending or financial- 
advisory practices of for-profit schools.”198 The CFPB mentioned its 
investigation of for-profit schools in federal court,199 but this  
justification was not included in its investigative purpose,200 or in its 
decision to deny ACICS’s petition.201 Second, it appears that Judge  
Leon accepted ACICS’s argument that the facts did not support a 
plausible allegation of substantial assistance.202 The court agreed with 
ACICS’s assertion that “the accreditation process simply has no 
connection to a school’s private student lending practices.”203 Further, 
Judge Leon pointed out that “ACICS is not involved in the financial aid 
decisions of the schools it accredits, which means it plays no part in 
deciding whether to make or fund a student loan.”204 Thus, the absence 
of any explicit reference to substantial assistance in the opinion is 
logical, because the CFPB itself did not invoke the term in its CID205  
and the CFPB could not point to actions taken by ACICS that could 
qualify as substantial assistance.206 
The court’s discussion of the “absence of a clear nexus”  
between the consumer financial laws under the care of the CFPB and  
the accreditation of for-profit schools begs the question:207 should the 
CFPB’s investigative authority with respect to facilitators be on par  
with its authority to investigate violators themselves?208 One 
interpretation of ACICS’s holding is that since the accreditation of 
schools is not within the purview of the CFPB, the agency was not 
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permitted to investigate the process under the substantial assistance 
provision on these facts.209 While the D.C. Circuit may shortly offer 
additional guidance, the district court’s holding implicitly proposes a 
sliding scale of judicial deference that skillfully balances both the 
agency’s interest in locating and finding violators and the CID 
recipient’s interest in avoiding unreasonable “fishing expeditions.”210 
Under this sliding scale, the judiciary’s deference to the CFPB will be at 
its greatest when there is “a clear nexus” between the CFPB’s mandate 
and the recipient;211 in other words, when the CFPB attempts to 
investigate potential violations of a “covered person” and the service it  
is offering to the public.212 When, however, the CFPB purports to 
investigate an entity not for its own product or practices, but because the 
CFPB is arguing that the entity is aiding another person in violating 
consumer laws, a court would require the CFPB to make more of a 
prima facie case that it actually “has reason to believe” the recipient has 
information “relevant to a violation.”213  Under this standard, it  would 
be more difficult for the CFPB to initiate an investigation when the 
recipient of the CID has a tenuous relationship to consumer financial 
protection laws and has made a coherent, “fact-based argument” that the 
recipient is either not under the jurisdiction of the CFPB or has not 
violated one of the laws that the CFPB is mandated to enforce.214 
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V. CONCLUSION 
As mentioned earlier, the ACICS case was the first time that the 
judiciary had stood in the way of the CFPB’s authority.215 In a sense, a 
result such as this one should offer encouragement to financial 
institutions.216 Moreover, the result may lead more entities to challenge 
CIDs issued by the CFPB.217 The long term practical effects of the 
ruling, however, remain to be seen.218 In response to the decision, the 
CFPB has elected to appeal to the D.C. Circuit,219 with both parties 
reiterating their positions in oral argument in early February.220 Thus, 
more clarification on the scope of the CFPB’s investigative authority 
should be on the way.221 In the meantime, the CFPB has continued  
filing CID enforcement actions in federal court against entities disputing 
the agency’s jurisdiction.222 2017 will thus be a momentous year not  
only with respect to the agency’s investigative powers, but also in other 
areas as well.223 
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Although the CFPB’s process may not be more onerous than 
investigative processes at other federal agencies,224 complying with a 
CID issued by the CFPB is still “a tall order for any organization.”225 
Pursuant to its own precedent, the CFPB can use a CID to initiate a 
broad-ranging investigation226 and can do so without “a detailed 
narrative” delineating the violating conduct.227 The potential burden on 
financial institutions is exacerbated by the CFPB’s increasingly frequent 
use of the substantial assistance tool, which not only expands the 
purview of the agency’s authority,228 but also can serve as an additional 
basis of jurisdiction for entities already covered under the statute.229 
Finally, the CFPB has rejected each recipient’s attempt to set aside a 
CID,230 due at least in part to its broad interpretation of the judiciary’s 
typical deference toward administrative subpoenas.231 The ACICS 
decision, however, demonstrates that judicial review does have some 
“bite” when it comes to reviewing the CFPB’s investigations,232 and 
more importantly, offered two solutions to these issues.233 By honing in 
on the language of the CID’s statement of purpose, the court was able to 
distinguish the agency’s internal analysis from its own review,234 and 
offered  the CFPB  an opportunity  to  narrowly  tailor  its  investigation 
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rather than create a broad and self-fulfilling CID.235 Further, the court 
implicitly suggested that entities that are not themselves alleged to be 
conducting deceptive and abusive practices with respect to consumer 
financial laws should be afforded more deference when they assert fact- 
based arguments disputing the germaneness of the issued CID.236 These 
solutions correctly balance the CFPB’s interest in narrowing the 
information gap between itself and its targets “who can best give [the 
information] and who are most interested in not doing so,”237 with the 
recipients’ interest in avoiding costly “fishing expeditions.”238 
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